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PREFACE
In the spring of 1988, the Permanent Editorial Board for the
Uniform Commercial Code, with the approval of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American
Law Institute, began a . formal study of Article 2 with the goal of
reaching a decision as to whether the text should be revised. To this
end, a Study Group was appointed, and Professor Richard E. Speidel
of Northwestern University was selected to serve as Project Director.•
On March 1, 1990, after two years of study, the Study Group issued
a 245-page preliminary report for general public discussion and consideration. 2
The Business Law Section of the American Bar Association has
long played an important role in the evolutionary development of the
Uniform Commercial Code. Since 1947 it has, through its divisions
and committees, carefully studied each draft as it was produced, ex-

1 Su Speidel, CommiJ!a Studie Revising U.C.C. Article 2, 8 Bus. Law. Update
3 (1988) (No. 6) (discussing the Article 2 Study).
2 An Executive Summary was issued by the Study Group on March 1, 1991.
On August 6, 1991, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
authorized the creation of an Article 2 Drafting Committee and the appointment of a
Reporter.
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pressed opinions on policy matters, and made suggestions for improvements. Continuing this tradition of participation, the Subcommittee on
General Provisions, Sales, Bulk Transfers, and Documents of Title of
the Committee on the Uniform Commercial Code undertook the task
of formulating conclusions with respect to the Preliminary Report. The
work of the Subcommittee began in May 1990 with the assemblage of
a ten-member Task Force. What follows is the report of that task force.
In the preparation of its report, the Task Force sought to consider
not only the substantive content of the Study Group's section-by-section
recommendations, but also more pervasive matters such as the scope
and approach of the Preliminary Report. Although not all members of
the Task Force share the Study Group's implicit viewpoint that revision
is due for Article 2, the prevalent opinion is that the bulk of the Study
Group's recommendations are sound and that revision is desirable.
Other subcommittees of the Uniform Commercial Code Committee of
the American Bar Association have also conducted studies of the Preliminary Report, and their reports should be looked to for more particularized views of the Preliminary Report.
David Frisch, Chair
Subcommittee on General Provisions, Sales, Bulk Transfers,
and Documents of Title
NOTE: The opinions and conclusions expressed in the Task Force
Report were not submitted to any body for approval. The Report does
not necessarily reflect the opinion of the full Subcommittee on General
Provisions, Sales, Bulk Transfers, and Documents of Title, the Uniform
Commercial Code Committee, the Business Law Section, or the American Bar Association.
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[PRELIMINARY REPORT - INTRODUCTION}

ARTICLE 2, SA.LES:
HISTORY, DRAFTING A.ND BA.SIC POLICIES
A.

A BRIEF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF ARTICLE 2.

The British Sale of Goods Act, enacted by Parliament in 1893, 1 was
used by Professor Samuel Williston as a model for the Uniform Sales Act
(USA), which was promulgated in 1906. The USA was ultz'mately enacted
in 34 states, the last enactment occurring in 1941. 2 Grant Gilmore, writing
in 1948, described the USA as a "scholarly reconstruction of 19th Century
law " which, in 1906, ''failed to move the law much closer to us than
1850. " 3 It was, in short, a prime example of what he and others have
called "classical" contract law.
In 1937, the Federal Sales Bill (The Chandler Bill), which was
sponsored by the New York City Merchant's Associatz'on and other commercial
groups, was drafted. 4 The Bill, which was based on the USA, was introduced
in Congress in 1937 hut never enacted.
The first drafts of a revised Uniform Sales Act were completed in 1940. J
These early efforts culminated in 1944 with a proposed Uniform Revised
Sales Act. 6 The 1944 Draft was a Joint proJect of the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) and the American
Law Institute. Karl N. Llewellyn was the Reporter and Soia Mentschikojf

1. Discussions of English sales law prior to 1893 are found in Llewellyn, Across
Sales on Horseback, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 725 (1939); Stone, The Origins of the Law of
Sales, 29 L.Q, Rev. 442 (1913).
2. See Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial Code, 58
Colum. L. Rev. 798, 799 (1958Xhereinafter Braucher, Legislative History).
3. Gilmore, On the Difficulties of Codifying Commercial Law, 57 Yale L. ].
1341, 1341-42 (1948). According to Gilmore, the USA failed because it neglected lo
"clarify the law about business transactions" that in fact occurred. Id. According lo Karl
N. Llewellyn, the USA was "obscure," "uncertain," "misleading," too "technical" and
contained numerous "traps" for the ordinary businessman acting in good faith. See Llewellyn,
Article 2, A Brief Opening Statement in Favor of the Article, N. Y. Law Rev. Commim'on,
Study of the Uniform Commercial Code 5 (1954).
4. The Bill is reprinted as H.R. 8176 (1940), in I Kelly, Uniform Commercial
Code Drafts 113-69 (1984Xhereinafter Kelly). The Kelly volumes include drafts of the
UCC issued by the American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws from 1940-62. See also Symposium, The Proposed Federal Sales
Act, 26 Va. L. Rev. 537 (1940).
5. See I Kelly at 174-260.
6. The 1944 Draft with extensive commentary is reprinted in II Kelly 1- 79, 80278.
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was the Associate Reporter for the 1944 draft and for much of the work
that followed.
By 1949, there was a first draft of a proposed Uniform Commercial
Code with comments. In the 1949 Draft, Article 2, Sales, was a further
revision of the Uniform Revised Sales Act. 7 In May, 1950, a "Final Draft"
of the UCC, with Text and Comments, was proposed. 8 But in September,
1950, further revisions in Article 2 were recommended and the work continll!d.
A Proposed "text onry" Final Draft #2 was then issued in the Spring of
19519 and an Official Draft with Comments was issued later that year.Jo
Text changes in this draft were proposed by the recentry created Editorial
Board for the UCC (EB), and the 1952 Official Draft, with changes, was
finalry promulgated as the 1953 Official Text. u The 1953 Official Text of
the UCC was enacted by Pennsylvania in April 1953, effective on Jury 1,
1954. 12 In response to a recommendation by the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York, JJ the New York Law Revision Commission held
exlensivf! hearing~ on the UCC in 1954. A detailed report .of their anarysis
a'nd conClusions
iSsued in 1955/1 and a condensed report and recommendation was submitted to the New York General Assembry in 1956. The
conclusions were critical of the 1953 Official Draft of the UCC, JS including
Article 2. 16 The New York Report prompted the EB to review earlier

was

7. See VI Kelly 47-263.
8. Article 2 of that Draft is reprinted in X Ke/{» 351-56. The proposed drafts of
Article 2 in 1949 and 1950 were the subject of Professor Wil/iston's famous allacl:,
Williston, The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 63 HaTTJ. L.
Rev. 561 (1950), and Professor Corbin's spirited defense, Corbin, The Uniform Commtrcial
Code-Sales: Should it be Enacted?, 59 Yale L.J. 821 (1950).
9. See XII Kelf» 416-83.
10. XIV Kelf» 43-174.
11. XVI Kelf» 55-264.
12. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 12A (1954).
13. XV Kelf» 307-42.
14. See New York Law Revision Commission &port for 1955, Study of the Uniform
Commtrcial Code (1955)(hminafter Report)
15. Two conclusions of the Report wm that the UCC was "not satisfactory in its
present form" and that it "cannot be mark satisfactory without comprehensire re-examination
and revision in the light of all critical comment obtainable. " Report of the Law Revision
Commission to the Legislature Relating to the Uniform Commercial Code, Leg. Doc. 65A,
57-8 (1956). See also, Brauchtr, Legislative History at 803-04.
16. See Report of the Law Revision Commission to the Legislature at 40-46. According
to William Schnarkr, the Commission discussed 40 of Article 2's 102 sections. Of thm
22 were approved, 13 were criticized but none was disappror:ed. J.{ore importantly, the
Commission approved the five main features of Article 2, name{»: (1) Abandonment of title
as a test for determining legal obligations; (2) The distinction between mmhant and non·
merchant sellers and buyers; (3) Relaxation of the statute of frauds; (4) New provisions
dealing with rules of construction or the implication of particular terms; and (5) Significant
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recommendations for change in the 1953 Text of Article 2 11 and to recommend
further revisions in 1956. 18 These second thoughts lead to the promulgation
of the 1958 Official Text with Comments19 and the ultimate enactment of
the complete UCC by every state except Louisiana. 20
Although other Articles of the UCC have been revised since 195821 and
a new Article 2A, Article 4A and Article 6 have been promulgated, the
Official Text of Article 2 remains fundamentally the same. 22 In the Spring
of 1988, however, the Permanent Editorial Board23 and the American Law
Institute, in conjunction with the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, approved a Study to consider whether Article 2 should
be revised and, if so, to report on what revisions might be required. The
charge to the Study Group was to identify "major problems of practical
importance" in the interpretation and application of Article 2. 21 The Study
also provides an opportunity to consider whether Article 2 is drafted as a
coherent whole and contains the internal unity necessary to support its underlying policies and to achieve harmony with other Articles z'n the UCC. 25
B.

DRAFTING ARTICLE 2: UNDERLYING POLICIES.
1.

Drafting Dilemmas.

Grant Gilmore argued that the purpose of general commercial legislation
should be to ''clarify the law about business transactions rather than change

changes in remedies. See Symposium, Panel Discussion of the UCC-Report of the New York
Law Revision Commission-Areas of Agreement and Disagreement, 12 Bus. Law. 49, 51
(1956). For a more focused discussion of the Commission's conclusions on Article 2, see
Pasley, Id. at 59-60.
17. These recommendations, proposed in 1955, are reprinted in XVI/ Kelly 32332. See also, Id. at 414-25.
18. XVIII Kelly 43-110.
19. XX Kelly 346 et seq.
20. Louisiana has now enacud all of the UCC except Articles 2, 2A and 6.
21. The main revisions were of Article 9 in 1972 and Article 8 in 1978. A revision
of Articles 3 and 4 is scheduled for completion in 1990.
22. In 1966, § 2-702(3) was revised to delete the phrase "or lien creditor." In
1972, § 2-107(1) was revised to include "oil and gas" within the definition of minerals
and § 2-107(2) was revised to add the phrase "or of timber to be cut." More recently,
the PEB has published "commentary" on particular provisions, which is designed to clarify
recurring disputes over proper interpretation.
23. The Editorial Board of the Uniform Commercial Code became the Permanent
Editorial Board (PEB) in 1961.
24. For an excellent analysis, see Leary & Frisch, Is Revision Due for Article 2,
31 · Vill. L. Rev. 399 (1986)(hereinafter Revision).
25. Professor (now Justice) Ellen Peters, writing in 1963, raised important questions
about the coherence and unity of Article 2. In particular, she questioned the consistency
between the sections dealing with performance of the contract and those dealing with remedies.
See Peters, Remedies for Breach of Contracts Relating to the Sale of Goods Under the UCC:
A Roadmap for Article 2, 73 Yale L.j. 199, 200-04 (1963)(hereinafter Roadmap).
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the habits of the business communiry" and that the principal object of a
draftsman is to be. "accurate and not to be original. " 26 Let us accept this
as a working principle, even though we may deviate upon occasion. Since
clarification and accuracy presuppose some knowledge about business "habits", two important dilemmas were posed for the drafters of Article 2.
First, it is hard to be accurate without knowledge of relevant practices.
At the inception of Article 2 there was no Jund of data systematical{y gathered
to inform the drafters. Moreover, access to such data is complicated by the
variery of contexts within which goods are sold and the different functions
performed by sellers and buyers. One could expect different habits depending
on whether the goods sold are race horses or computer software or natural
gas or clothing or new automobiles or factory equipment or whether the seller
is a jobber rather than a manufacturer or whether the bu;•er purchases for
commercial consumption or resale or consumer consumption. In these overlapping contexts, actual business practices are difficult to identify and quantify, much less to evaluate.
Second, there are some "habits" of the business communiry that may
need changing. Granted, the law of crimes, torts, antitrust, unfair competition
and fraud is there to deter and punish egregious misconduct. Should, then,
a commercial statute be concerned about bad habits that fall between the
cracks and, if so, how does one determine what is bad and what remedies
are appropriate? The question has particular relevance for disputes where the
buyer is a consumer, i.e., an individual who purchases for personal, fami{y
or household purposes.
In the paragraphs to follow, we will briefly (1) examine how these
drafting dilemmas were resolved in the 1958 Official Text of Article 2 and
(2) recommend how a Drafting Committee might proceed in the revision of
Article 2.
2.

Under{ying Policies.

Article 2, Sales, deals primari{y with contracts for the sale of goods.
Article 2 may cover other transactions in goods, either direct{y or by analogy,
but the primary transaction is the sale. 27
Within this transactional limitation, Article 2, aided by the general
definitions and provisions of Article 1, avoids the first drafting dilemma by
utilizing flexible standards, such as commercial reasonableness and good

26. Gilmore, On the Diffoulties of Codifying Commercial Law, 57 Yale L.J. 1341,
1341-42 (1948).
27. See § 2-106(1), which states that in Article 2 "unless the conttxl othawi'se
requires 'contract' and 'agreement' are limited to those relating lo the present or futuu sale
of goods."
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faith, rather than rules that purport to capture and solidify prevailing practices
and norms. Each dispute between a seller and buyer is placed in its functional
setting where the parties are expected to find and prove relevant ''habits, ''
i.e., trade usage or practices, as part of the agreement. 28 Under these
standards, the court is given flexibility (at some cost to certainty and administrability) to resolve the new or unique dispute. Moreover, standards
are thought to reduce the gap between law and practice and to insure that
decisions are practical and responsive to the needs, proven in the particular
case, of the parties and the relevant business community. 29
In addition to this emphasis upon standards and the rejection of "title"
as a problem solving concept, 30 several other basic policies underlie the drafting
approach in Article 2.
(a)

Broad Scope and Effect of Agreement.

An underlying purpose of the UCC is to ''permit the continued expansion
of commercial practices through custom, usage and agreement of the parties. . . . '' § 1-102(2)(b). This purpose31 is implemented, in part, by a
broad definition of agreement in § 1-201(3), and the delegation to the parties
of power, albeit limited, to choose which state's version of Article 2 applies,
§ 1-105(1), and to vary "the effect of provisions of this Act. . . by
agreement. ... " § 1-102(3).
These provisions, supplemented by § 1-205, entitled "Course of Dealing
and Usage of Trade, '' are relevant to a wide range of issues of liability
and remedy arising under Article 2. 32 Thus, under Article 2, the expansible

28. See § 1-201(3). Peters states, for example, that the performance obligation is
stated in "terms of operative facts rather than legal conclusions. " The emphasis is upon
actual, provable circumstances within the control of the parties rather than upon rules within
the control of the courts. Roadmap at 202.
29. Cf. Eisenberg, The Responsive Model of Contract Law, 36 Stan. L. Rev.
1107, 1109 (1984), who asserts that "law is• . . a purposive institution whose principles
and theories are normative and prescriptive. . . [and that] contract is a social institution
before it is a legal institution, and the rules of contract law must respond to the social
institution, not to autonomous legal conventions. "
30. § 2-401.
31. Section 1-102(1) provides that this "Act shall be liberally construed and applied
to promote its underlying purposes and policies" and then, in S 1-102(2), states what
those purposes and policies are.
32. Whether the agreement of the parties is in law a contract for sale is a separate
question. See § 1-201(11), where "contract" is defined to mean the "total legal obligation
which results from the parties' agreement as affected by this Act and a'!)' other applicable
rules of law." Cf. § 2-106(1Xdefining the scope of the phrase "contract for sale").
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agreement ef the parties, i.e., the "bargain infact," rather than the promise
provides the foundation stone ef the transaction. 33
One important c,onsequence of this approach is that values and norms
which are "imminent" in the relevant context may be extracted and applied
by the court, whether they emerge in determining the agreement in fact ef
the parties or in filling ''gaps" in that agreement. 31 In theory, at least,
differences created by .the types of goods sold and the economic roles played
by the seller and buyer should emerge in the litigation process.
(b) Application ef Standards in the Absence ef Agreement: "Gap"
Filling.
Article 2-may impose obligations on parties whose agreement is incomplete
or omits material terms. There are no rules of offer and acceptance that state
how much agreement must be reached before a contract exists. Rather, Article
2 provides flexible standards that depend upon (a) what the parties intended
or (b) what they would have intended if they had considered it (the so-called
"hypothetical" bargain.)
The "intention" test is illustrated by § 2-204(3), which provides that
"even though one or more terms are left open a contract for sale does not
fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a contract and
there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate reme4Ji. " Conduct
by both parties which "recognizes the existence ef such a contract" is the
best evidence ef intention. § 2-204(1). See § 2-207(3). If the requisite
intention to conilude the bargain is not present, however, no contract is
formed. Compare § 2-305(4). If the requisite intention is present, enforceability depends upon the certainty ef the agreement. This, in tum, depends
upon relevant facts derived from the commercial context.
The "hypothetical" bargain is illustrated by the provisions in Article
2, Part 3. 35 If the parties have intended to contract but have not agreed
upon a particular term, the court is invited to supply a "reasonable" term
to fill the "gap. " Thus, if the price was not agreed, the parties are hound
by a "reasonable price at the time for delivery." § 2-305(1). 36 The

33. See, e.g., Murray, The Article 2 Prism: The Undnlying Philosophy of Article
2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 21 Washburn L. J. 1 (1981); Mooney, Old Konlraet
Principles and Karl's New Kode: An Essay on the Jurisprudence of Our New Commercial
Law, 11 Vill. L. Reo. 213 (1966).
34. See Danzig, Comment on the Jurisprodenu of the Uniform Commerei"al Code,
27 Stan. L. Reo. 621 (1975). See also, Gedid, U.C.C. Melhodology: Taking A Realislic
Look at the Code, 29 Wm & Mary L. Reo. 341 (1988).
35. See also § 1-204, which concerns IM requirement of "muonable" lime.
36. If a reasonable price is not established, the conlract fails for indejinilene.ss. S 2204(3).
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assumption here is that the appropriate norms, i.e., the "situation sense, "
can be derived from the surrounding commercial context. 37 Consistency with
a consent based theory is maintained by assuming that the "off the rack"
terms would have been agreed to if considered by the parties. 38
(c)

The "Merchant" Standards.

With few exceptions, Article 2 does not differentiate between sellers and
buyers, whether they are in commercial or consumer transactions. That
exception concerns transactions involving or "between " 39 "merchants, " as
that person is defined in § 2-104(1). In these situations, different or higher
standards bind the merchant than those applicable to others. For example,
only a merchant seller can make a firm offer, § 2-205, or an implied
warranry of merchantabiliry, § 2-314(1). In addition, merchants have a
higher dury of good faith, § 2-103(l)(b), and greater power to pass good
title § 2-403(2), and may ignore certain writings at their peril, §§ 2201(2) & 2-207(2).
The "merchant" standards, which are limited to Article 2, have been
subjected to extensive analysis and evaluation. 40 Despite questions about their
origins and effect, they reflect a common sense judgment about the respon·
sibilities of persons involved in commerce. As one commentator put it, ''it
may be said that what's good for businessmen in Article 2 is good for the
rest of us. " 41 Nevertheless, one can question whether this endorsement should
apply to consumers or whether the "merchant" standards should be applied
to other articles of the UCC.

37. See Gedid, supra Note 34 at 361-71, discussing Llewellyn's approach to commercial law. See also, Restatement, Second, Contracts § 204 which provides: "When the
parties to a bargain sufficiently defined to be a contract have not agreed with respect to a
term which is essential to a determination of their rights and duties, a term which is
reasonable in the circumstances is supplied by the court. "
38. But see Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L. ]. 87 (1989)(questioning conventional justifications
for "gap filling'?.
39. See § 2-104(3).
40. See, e.g., Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant
Rules, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 465 (1987)(arguing that because Llewellyn did not accomplish
all that he intended in the drafting process, the "merchant" rules in Article 2 emerged in
a patchwork and sometimes incoherent fashion).
41. Hi/linger, The Article 2 Merchant Rules: Karl Llewellyn's Attempt to Achieve
the Good, the True and the Beautiful in Commercial Law, 73 Geo. L.J. 1141, 117680 (1985).
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Legal Controls on the Agreement: Unconscionability and Good
Faith.

Two important limitations upon the "bargain in fact" are the requirement that a contract or clause not be unconscionable "at the time it
was made,'' § 2-302(1), and the imposition of an obligation of good faith
on the "performance or enforcement" of every contract or duty with the
UCC. § 1-203.
The conscionability requirement is imposed by and apparently limited
to Article 2. It operates, primarily, at the time of contracting'2 to protect
one party from bargaining abuses that are not otherwise regulated by the
doctrines of fraud, duress or mistake. Despite early criticism of § 2-302, 13
the courts have exercised restraint in identifying what has been called "procedural" unconscionability44 in both consumer and commercial transactions. 15
The duty of good faith is imposed in Article 1, see § 1-203, and is
elaborated in Article 2 through a higher, objective standard of good faith for
merchants. § 2-103(1)(b). It operates, pn"marily, after the contract has been
formed. Despite acceptance of the duty in general contract law, 16 there is
continuing disagreement about such questions as the scope of duty, what
conduct constitutes bad faith and the remedies that are available when bad
faith is established. 4 1
Despite their statutory origins, both limitations now find wide acceptance
in general contract law.
Rec. Int. (1)
The Study Group endorses the drafting s~le utilized in Article
2 and recommends that the general sales policies, discussed above,
42. But see Kniffin, A Newly Identified Contraet Unconscionability: Unconscionability of Remedy, 63 Notre Dame L. Rev. 247 (1988)(court should consider tfftct of
agreed remedy at time of breach).
43. A classic critical article is Leff, Unconscionability and the Codt: The Emperor's
New Clause, 115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 485 (1967). For more balanced assessmmts, see
Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 Yale L. J. 757 (1967); Spanogle,
Analyzing Unconscionability Problems, 117 U. Pa. L. Rev. 931 (1969). Ste also, Hillman,
Debunking Some Myths About Unconscionability: A New Framework for U. C. C. Section
2-302, 67 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (1981).
44. See Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J. Law & Econ.
293, 315 (1975)(distinguishing between defects in the process of contract formation ("procedural") and complaints about the substance of the terms included in the apparent bargain
("substantive").
45. See Mallor, Unconscionability in Contracts Between Merchants, 40 Sw. L.J.
1065 (1986).
46. See Restatement, Second, Contracts § 205.
47. An important article is Summers, Good Faith in General Contract Law and the
Sales Provisions of the UCC, 54 Va. L. Rev. 195 (1968). For a rteent application, see
Andersen, Good Faith in the Enforcement of Contracts, 73 Iowa L. Rev. 299 (1988).
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be retained. There is little evidence that these policies have interfered
with commerce by creating an unacceptable level of uncertainty for
the parties or administrative costs for the courts. Rather, the policies
appear to establish a commendable balance between facilitation (efficiency) and regulation (fairness) in contracts for sale where neither
party is a consumer. Above all, they delegate power to the parties
to fashion their own agreement.
We recommend that the Drafting Committee consider ways
beyond those recommended by the Study Group to articulate these
policies and to improve their implementation. The objective is to
achieve a more complete utilization of them by the parties and the
courts in the resolution of commercial disputes.
C.

CONSUMER PROTECTION.

A second drafting dilemma concerns the extent to which a commercial
statute should attempt to deter or alter the conduct of persons engaged in a
trade or of parties to the contract for sale. The Article 2 solution is to
invoke general standards to reJect commercially unreasonable practices, 48 avoid
unconscionable contracts or clauses and treat bad faith performance or enforcement as a breach of contract regardless of who the parties are. Beyond
that, Article 2 is neutral when direct issues of regulation are posed. The
are no special provisions designed to provide protection to a consumer buyer
in transactions with a merchant seller. 49 Rather, § 2-102 simply provides
that Article 2 does not impair or repeal "any statute regulating sales to
consumers, farmers or other specified classes of buyers."
Since the 1958 Official Text was approved, there have been numerous
important developments in consumer protection on both the federal and state
level. They include the increased regulation of both credit and sales practices,
as well as the content of the consumer contract for sale and the growth of
state "little" FTC Acts which are invoked in both consumer and commercial
transactions. 50 There are, however, noticeable gaps in coverage where Congress

48. See Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under
the UCC, 30 U. Chi. L. Rev. 666 (1963).
49. § 2-103(3) incorporates for Article 2 the definition of "consumer goods" found
in § 9-109(1). § 2-719(3), dealing with the validity of clauses limiting consequential
damages ''for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods, " is the only substantive
section of Article 2 that mentions consumer goods.
50. See, generally, Macaulay, Bambi Meets Godzilla: Reflections on Contracts Schol·
arship and Teaching vs. State Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer Protection
Statutes, 26 Hous. L. Rev. 575 (1989); Lawrence, Toward a More Efficient and Just
Economy: An Argument for Limited Enforcement of Consumer Promises, 48 Ohio St. L.j.
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or the FTC has failed to go far enough and other state legislation is incomplete
or non-existent. For example, many states either have failed to enact comprehensive consumer protection legislation or have enacted legislalion, such
as the "lemon" laws, that does not fill the gaps in coverage under the
Magnuson-Moss Warranry Act. This result has been criticised by some
commentators. 51
Rec. Int. (2)
Despite these gaps in coverage and the decision in .Article 2A
to provide special protection in some cases to consumer lessees,"2 the
Study Group makes the following recommendations to the Drafting
Committee:
(A) The revised Article 2 should neither incorporate more comprehensive consumer protection legislation than already enacted apart
from the UCC nor contain new sections special{y drafted to fill
apparent gaps. The responsibility for enacting comprehensive consumer protection legislation should be. located outside of the scope
of general. commercial· legislation;
(B) The Drafting Committee should consider whether the limited; special consumer protection provisions in Article 2A. are appropriate for inclusion in a revised Article 2,·
(C) The Study Group, in the Report to follow, will consider
whether limited affirmative rules for consumers are appropriate in
certain areas now covered by Article 2, e.g., the scope of warranties,
disclaimers and limited remedies or the content of unconscionability
antf, good faith, and make recommendations to the Drafting Committee;
(D) Section 2-102 should be revised to state that subject to any
statute or decision which establishes a different rule for seller or

815 (1987); Blumberg, Consumer Protection in the United States: Control of Unfair or
Unconscionable Practices, 34 Am. J. Comp. L. 99 (Supp. 1986); Coffinberger & Samuds,
Legislative Responses to the Plight of New Car Purchasers, 18 U.C.C. L.J. 168 (1985);
Note, Examining Restraints on Freedom to Contract as an Approaeh to Purchastr Dissat·
isfaction in the Computer Industry, 74 Calif. L. Reo. 2101 (1986); Note, Reoising the
Law of Substantioe Unconscionability: Applying the Implitd Cormant of Good Faith and
Fair Dealing to Excessioely Priced Consumer Credit Contracts, 33 UCLA L. Reo. 940
(1986).
51. See generally, Rice, Product Quality Laws and the Economics of Federalism,
65 B. U.L. Reo. 1 (1985).
52. See Miller, Consumer Leases Under Uniform Commercial Code Article 2A, 39
Ala. L. Reo. 957 (1988). Article 2A contains a "limited" number of exprtss consumer
protection prooisions. Id. at 964-74.
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buyers of consumer goods, the provisions of Article 2 shall apply. 53
[TASK FORCE - INTRODUCTION]
I.

REVISION oR ,CLARIFICATION THROUGH THE UsE OF CooE
COMMENTS

The Preliminary Report is replete with instances where revision
or clarification of Uniform Commercial Code ("Code") Comments
is the recommended method for solving a particular Code problem.
The Task Force strongly believes that an attempt must be made
to formulate and apply a workable standard for determining when
it is appropriate to proceed by redrafting the commentary and
when the revision or clarification should be reflected in the language
of the statute itself. Admittedly, the formulation of the requisite
standard is not an easy matter.
The function of the Comments as conceived by Professor
Llewellyn was to assist the courts in their application of the Code
by providing an authoritative guide to the purposes and reasons
for each section. To what extent the Comments have, in fact,
influenced decision-making is far from clear. Part of the difficulty
stems from the divergent opinions surrounding their use and authoritativeness. Despite the frequently encountered view that the
Comments are persuasive but not binding, 1 it is not unusual to
find that they were not followed in a case either because it was
thought that their application would lead to an inappropriate result, 2
or would effectively vary the plain language of the statute. 3 Consider
also the situation in Colorado where a statute provides that 11 [ t )he
inclusion of said nonstatutory matter [the Comments] shall be for
the purpose of information and no implication or presumption of
legislative intent shall be drawn therefrom. " 4
A further complication results from the failure of many courts
to state with a sufficient degree of clarity why a particular Comment
is or is not being followed. Consequently, it may be difficult to

53. Cf § 2A-104, which states to types of statutes to which a lease might be subject
and provides a rule to determine which statute controls in the event of conflict.
1 See, e.g., Bickett v. W.R. Grace & Co., 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Cal·
laghan) 629, 642 (W.D. Ky. 1972).
2 See, e.g., Consolidated Film Indus. v. United States, 547 F. 2d 533,
536-37 (10th Cir. 1977).
3 See, e.g., Wright v. Bank of Cal., 276 Cal. App. 2d 485, 490, 81 Cal.
Rptr. 11, 14 (1969).
4 COLO. REV. STAT. § 2-5-102(4) (1989).
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tell how that very same court will treat the Comments in the future.
Accordingly, legislation by comment may or may not bring
about the changes and clarifications recommended by the Study
Group. The indiscriminate use of the Comments as a tool of change
militates against uniformity and therefore should be abandoned.
In his fine article on the Comments, Professor Skilton observed
that they may be "(1) expository-seeking to describe the meaning
and application of a section of the Code and its relationship with
other sections, (2) gap-filling-seeking to suggest answers to questions not precisely covered by the text, or (3) promotional and
argumentative-seeking to 'sell' a controversial section. "S
It is the second mentioned function of the Comments which
has the potential to cause the most difficulty. To borrow again
from Professor Skilton, "[w]e cannot ask the comments to do the
work that should be done by the text. " 6 It seems that if disagreement on a particular point would be harmful to the uniform
application of the Code, that point should be dealt with in the
text. It makes no sebse, for example, to define a term in the
Comments if, as a result, that definition is ignored or modified
by the courts.
At least one Task Force member believes that nothing should
be done by way of comment unless the accompanying text is also
being changed. As he sees it, comments clarify the author's meaning
in the accompanying text; consequently, it is not proper to write
any comments at this time to explain which text is not also being
modified. Thus, the key is not to find a workable distinction
between "clarifications" and "substantive changes," presumably
allowing the former to be done by new comments on the old text.
Such a distinction"will prove elusive at best. However, where new
statutory text is being added, clarifications of the new parts may
be made by comment.
For these reasons, the Task Force strongly believes that a more
cautious approach to the Comments is needed.
II.

THE SUBSTANTIVE COVERAGE OF ARTICLE

2

The need to reconsider the scope of Article 2 is a theme that
has pervaded the dialogue of revision. In particular, with the

5 Skilton, Some Comments on the Comments ta the Uniform Commercial Code,
1966 Wis. L. REv. 597, 608.
6 Id. at 614.
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promulgation of Article 2A, the common perception of the scope
problem now centers around the extent to which Article 2 should
apply to contracts with a service component. 7
The Study Group apparently includes in that category the
incredible panoply of problems flowing from the explosion of computer technology, but leaves the distinct impression in a footnote
that those issues should be left to a different Study Group already
created under different auspices. 8 It is difficult to see how an Article
2 revision could successfully finesse the issues in that way. No
matter what emanates, if anything, from the other work, many
computer-related transactions will still so affect sales matters as to
necessitate some application of Article 2. The issues are too interrelated and important not to be considered in any revision of
Article 2.
The Study Group Report's focus on existing sections also lacks
any inquiry into such matters as including within a new Article
2 those areas of contract law on which the Code is presently silent.
In preparing this appraisal, the issue of coverage was approached from two angles. First, an attempt was made to form
some general impressions about the extent to which courts have
relied on certain non-Code doctrines in deciding cases involving
the sale of goods. The second angle involved the question of whether
the information learned would help explain why some pre-Code
doctrines were codified and others were not. Therefore, the subjects
selected for this informal empirical study were doctrines which are
closely related to existing Code doctrines. They include the law of
contract beneficiaries, mistake, and frustration of purpose. The
frequency of application of each doctrine was determined by reference to judicial citation of Restatement sections found in the
appendices to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.
The initial choice for inclusion in this study was the thirdparty beneficiary doctrine. This was particularly attractive because
the Code not only contains provisions pertaining to a conceptually
related doctrine, 9 but does in fact deal with some aspects of the

7 See U.C.C. § 2-102 (1990) (stating that the scope of Article 2 applies
only to transactions in goods).
8 Prelim. Rpt., Part 1 n.5 and accompanying text, infra p. 1010.
9 The law of assignments also deals with the rights of third persons who
were not parties to the original contract. But unlike the third-party beneficiary,
the assignee acquires its rights subsequent to the contract's formation. See, e.g.,
u.c.c. §§ 2-210 & 9-318 (1990).
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beneficiary problem. For example, section 2-318 offers three alternative approaches to the extension of warranty liability to third
parties, and section 2-210 touches on the enforceability of an
assignee's promise to perform the assignor's duties. 10 According to
this study, there were no less than 19 sales cases that cited one
or more sections of the Restatement or Restatement (Second) for
an aspect of third-party beneficiary law on which the Code is
silent. 11
Although the Code explicitly recognizes the doctrine of impracticability of performance, 12 it says nothing of the doctrine of
frustration of purpose although the two share a common conceptual
base, that is, both deal with erroneous forecasts of the future. In
tw'Clve instances, frustration was argued in a sale of goods case
with citation to either the First or Second Restatement.
Of greater quantitative significance is the doctrine of mistake.
Mistake is characterized as a related doctrine because it, too,
qualifies or excuses performance on the ground that one or both
parties erred in their assumptions. In all, there were seventeen
cases in which this doctrine was referred to.
These findings about the frequency of citation to the Restatements and non-Code law are not surprising. Both as a practical
and a political matter, the coverage of the Code must be limited
to some degree. It is inevitable, therefore, that contract litigation
will occasionally implicate law that is external to the Code. This
is not meant to suggest, however, that the choices made are inconsequential. To the extent that outside law is controlling, the
goals of the Code are jeopardized. For example, the exclusion of
mistake from the Code leaves (as this empirical survey suggests)
a substantial gap in the Code's coverage of the law of mistaken
assumptions. This is especially troubling where the gap must be
filled by unpredictable law that is subject to competing tensionsthe desire for commercial stability and sympathy for a mistaken

10 See U.C.C. § 2-210(4) (1990).
11 See, e.g., United States v. Pall Corp., 367 F. Supp. 976, 980 (E.D.N.Y.
1973) (citing RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 133 (1932) for the general rule that
a person may claim as a third party beneficiary if the performance of a promise
will satisfy a duty of the promisee to the beneficiary); United States v. Glassman
Constr. Co., 266 F. Supp. 110, 115 (D. Md. 1967) (citing RESTATEMENT OF
CONTRACTS § 140 for the proposition that a third party beneficiary can acquire
greater rights against a promisor than the promisee).
12 See U.C.C. § 2-615 (1990).
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contract party. 13 Furthermore, the potential for confusion is further
exacerbated by the inherent indeterminacy of U.C.C. section 1103.14
It is not suggested that the law of mistake or any other particular doctrine should be added to a revised Article 2. The point
is rather that greater attention should be paid to how complete a
statement the Code should make on the law of sales, and that the
volume of cases involving non-Code law is a source of useful
information in this regard. It remains to be determined, however,
how heavily this information should be weighed. The fact is that
having this information would strengthen whatever decisions are
ultimately made.

III.
A.

CONSUMER CONSIDERATIONS

The Recommendations Regarding Consumer Provisions

There is a degree of ambivalence about the Study Group's
recommendations pertaining to consumers. On the one hand, there
is a clear attempt to declare neutrality. This begins with the assessment that the general policies of Article 2 "establish a commendable balance between facilitation (efficiency) and regulation
(fairness) in contracts for sale where neither party is a consumer. " 15 It
continues with the recommendation that "[t]he revised Article 2
should neither incorporate more comprehensive consumer protection legislation than already enacted apart from the UCC nor
contain new sections specially drafted to fill apparent gaps. The
responsibility for enacting comprehensive consumer protection legislation should be located outside of the scope of general commercial
legislation. '' 16
On the other hand, the Report, early on, acknowledges "numerous important developments in consumer protection on both
13 Newman, Relief for Mistake in Contracting, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 232,
237 (1969). The risk of inconsistent decisions in this area is due in part to the
dichotomy in Anglo-American law between the desire for stability of commercial
transactions on the one hand, and concern over the unfairness of enforcing a
contract against a party who lacked complete information regarding all the
relevant circumstances. Id. at 236-37. This problem of inconsistency is compounded by the fact that the Second Restatement contains a significantly different
articulation of the doctrine than that contained in the first.
14 See infra pp. 1010-12 and text accompanying notes 48-51.
15 Prelim. Rpt., Introduction, Rec. Int. (1), supra p. 993-94 (emphasis
added).
16 Prelim. Rpt., Introduction, Rec. Int. (2)(A), supra p. 995.

